ABSTRACT Currently, the security of information in the physical layer has attracted much attentions. However, such a physical layer security of conventional study depends on the assumption of reciprocity between the uplink and downlink channels. This assumption cannot be ensured in the time-selective channel of mobile communications. Hence, this paper proposes an encryption algorithm in mobile communications. First, the statistics of time-selective channel are extracted to act as the seeds for multiple chaos generator. Second, the produced chaos sequences are combined to produce the secret code. Finally, the physical signal is encrypted by the simple scrambling operation. We verify the proposed algorithm by computer simulations, and the results demonstrate that the encrypted data can be successfully recovered by the legal receiver, while the sniffer produces poor and flat bit-error-rate performance in a wide range of signal-to-noise ratios.
to enlarge the channel variations and link security. In [30] , the researchers proposed to randomly rotate the symbol phase to protect the link security, while in [31] , both the amplitude and phase of constellation were varied to encrypt the modulation signal. However, previous physical layer security based on channel variations requires the assumption of channel reciprocity, which can be ensured in the static channel or quasi-static channel, i.e., the mobile speed is so small that the time-selectivity of channel can be neglected. Accordingly, if we concern the air-interface protection in the time-selective channel, the perfect channel reciprocity cannot be a reasonable assumption.
In order to tackle above problem, we propose to use the channel statistics to extract the secret key and then encrypt the modulation signal, where the time-selective channel caused by the MS movement is taken into consideration, i.e., the vehicular environment. The reason is that the channel statistics of uplink/downlink channels remain reciprocal even in time-selective channels, while the uplink and downlink channel coefficients (or phases) exhibit significant difference at this time. In the proposed algorithm, there are three important issues. First, we exploit the channel autocorrelation function (ACF) and level crossing rate (LCR) to act as the seeds of chaos systems, and then the chaos sequence is used as the cryptographic keys. Second, the channel difference between the legal transceiver and the eavesdropper ensures that the latter cannot decrypt the receiving signal, i.e., the physical layer safety is realized. Finally, the proposed algorithm makes full use of the consistency of uplink/downlink channel statistics to realize the legal decryption, while it uses the sensitivity (or variability) of channel to prevent the potential sniffers. To the best knowledge of the author, it is the first time to study the physical layer security based on channel variations in the time-selective channel.
The rest of this paper is constructed as follows. In section II, channel model and scheme of encryption algorithm are introduced. And in section III, the key generation method and the extraction method of channel statistical characteristics are presented. The scheme is simulated and verified, and the security of the algorithm is analyzed in section IV. Finally, section V concludes this paper.
II. TIME-SELECTIVE CHANNEL MODEL AND THE RECIPROCITY
Without loss of generality, a simplified spatial channel model (SCM), also known as the geometry-based stochastic channel model (GSCM) [32] , is shown in Fig.1 , where the base station (BS) equips with two omnidirectional antennas and the mobile station (MS) has only one omnidirectional antenna. The scatterers are distributed in the circle centered at MS, and the eavesdropper is located near the MS. Besides, we explicitly see that the eavesdropper must be close to MS so as to share nearly the same scatters around MS. Otherwise, the channel of eve will be completely deviated from that of MS according to the theory of GSCM. In fact, this location assumption is the best and worst scenarios for eavesdropper and MS respectively, yet our design produce a good secrecy performance in such a disadvantageous scenario, which will be demonstrated next. Finally, we must highlight again that if the eavesdropper cannot share the same scatters around the MS, the different random phases of scatters will make the eavesdropping channel and the legal channel be completely different in both statistics and coefficients. Then, Eve cannot eavesdrop the communication between BS and MS in this case.
From Fig.1 , there must exist three time-selective channels produced by the same scatters, defined as the u s,m (t), u m,s (t) and u s,e (t). In detail, the previous three channel symbols represent the signal from the s th transmitting antenna at BS to the MS, the signal from the MS to the s th received antenna at BS and the signal from the s th transmitting antenna at BS to the Eve, respectively. If the channel is reciprocal, people expect that u s,m (t) = u m,s (t) and u s,m (t) = u s,e (t). However, this expectation cannot be ensured for the time-selective channel in real-world mobile communication, such as the vehicular communication.
We can write the expressions for u s,m (t), u m,s (t) and u s,e (t) as:
where P and P e denote the path powers, while σ SF and σ SFe denote the lognormal fading factors. f d and f e represent the normalized maximum Doppler shift of legal channel and eavesdropping channel, and they may yield close values due to the above location assumption. β n , α n and ϕ n represent the angle between the n th scatterer and the BS, the angle between the n th scatterer and the MS, the angle between the n th scatterer and the sniffer, respectively. θ n as well as φ n are random phases, and they will be the same for the same scatter.
Finally, k is the beam factor and d s is distance of antenna array element at BS. These parameter definitions are the same as the GSCM in [32] and the references therein. From formulae (1)∼(3), we must indicate the following issues.
• u s,m (t) is different from u m,s (t) in some sense.
• The power spectrum density (PSD) of u s,m (t) is the same as that of u m,s (t) for the symmetric PSD, such as the classical Jakes PSD.
• u s,m (t) may be far more deviated from u s,e (t) in general, since the GSCM theory [32] has revealed that equations (1)∼(3) are sensitive to even trivial angle variations despite of both f d and f e . It is clearly that the angle parameters of eavesdropper are different from those of MS, although they are adjacent to each other and share the same scatters.
• The PSD of u s,m (t) is quite different from that of u s,e (t) due to above explanations.
• Since MS is moving continuously, the scatters are also time-varying, which riches the variations of channel statistics and increases the secrecy of the proposed algorithm. To the best knowledge of the author, it is the first time to study the channel reciprocity in the time-selective channel, and our observations will benefit the research on the physical layer security of mobile communications. Specifically, our study employs two choices for f e in the derivation and simulation, i.e., f e ∈ {0.8, 1}, the reason can be explained as follows.
• This assumption covers the worst case for MS, i.e., f e = f d , where eavesdropper is synchronously moved with MS regardless of its exposure possibility.
• The sniffer cannot track the MS synchronously in practice, but it must maintain a tolerable distance from MS. Otherwise, they will belong to two different scatter circles, resulting in eavesdropping failure. Hence, there exists a smallest f e , which is 0.8*f d in our simulation setup.
• The secrecy of our design increases with decreased f e . However, even if f e = f d , the angle difference in (1) and (3) ensures the secrecy of the proposed algorithm. From above discussions, we can conclude that the physical layer security depending on the reciprocity of channel coefficient (or phase) cannot work well in the time-selective channels, while the reciprocal channel statistics may bring forth certain physical layer encrypting algorithms. Next, we will propose such a physical layer security system according to the reciprocity of channel statistics.
III. DESIGN OF ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM BASED ON CHANNEL STATISTICAL CHARACTERISTICS A. PHYSICAL LAYER ENCRYPTION SYSTEM MODEL
As indicated previously, the uplink and downlink channels exhibit the reciprocity of statistical characteristic. Hence, here we will propose a physical layer encryption system as shown in Fig.2 . In Fig.2 , we first use key1 (binary key) to encrypt the transmitted data bit by bit, and then map the encrypted bits to the QAM constellation, finally use key2 (real-valued key) to encrypt the QAM signal symbol by symbol. At the receiver, the processing is reversed. Besides, the two-step encryption will increase the difficulty of signal eavesdropping. Specially, the real-valued encryption at the second step will destroy the regular constellation, which further increase the illegal decrypting difficulty. Then, the remained problem is how to generate the secret key. Once the keys are obtained, the simple signal scrambling operation is employed n our study to encrypt the transmitted data. Finally, we must indicate that our study assumes the perfect equalization of fading channels to focus on the encryption system only.
B. THE GENERATION OF ENCRYPTION KEY
Before the detailed derivation, we should know that the uplink (downlink) channel is perfectly known to the BS (MS) in our research. Since the BS (MS) does not know the downlink (uplink) channel, the encrypting key cannot be produced by the channel coefficients, such as the amplitude and phase.
The discussion in section II has revealed that the PSD is reciprocal for the symmetric case. Moreover, there exists an one-to-one match between the PSD, the ACF and the LCR according the the channel modeling theory. Therefore, the ACF and LCR are also reciprocal at this time. In fact, according to the symmetric form of equation (1)∼(3), it is easy to derive that the LCR as well as the absolute value of ACF are reciprocal even for the asymmetric PSDs. Thus, the two channel statistics can be used to generate the encrypting key, the detailed generation process can be found in Fig.3 .
In Fig.3 , the channel status information at BS and MS are known to compute the ACF and LCR. Note that here ACF indeed represents the absolute value of actual ACF. Second, the computed ACF and LCR are quantized into discrete numbers, which are feed to the Chaotic sequence generators. Each chaotic sequence generator requires two parameters: the initial value (or seed) and the chaotic parameter. In the upper Chaotic sequence generator, the LCR and ACF are used as the seed and Chaotic parameter, and the output chaotic sequence will be converted into binary sequence (key1). In the lower Chaotic sequence generator, the LCR also acts as the seed, while the output of the upper Chaotic sequence generator plays an role of Chaotic parameter. Finally, key2 can be obtained from the lower Chaotic sequence generator. With the help of key1 and key2, we can respectively scramble the bit stream and modulated symbol stream to encrypt the transmitted signal. In the above process, when we compute the LCR and ACF, we must determine the threshold ratio and the delay lag. These two parameters are chosen from a random number table stored in BS and MS, so that both BS and MS can synchronously choose the same parameters.
Note that the variation of channel statistics is slower that of channel coefficient, while the amount of variation affects the security of the proposed algorithm. Hence, it is necessary to enhance the variable space for the encryption key, which is the reason of using chaotic sequences in our study. In fact, the chaotic system is sensitive to the initial condition, and the system will produce completely different system evolution trajectories under slightly different parameters. Hence, the finite difference of channel statistics will lead to significantly different chaotic sequences. As a conclusion, the introduction of chaotic sequence in this paper can ensure the randomness of the encryption key as well as the difference between the legal signal and the eavesdropping signal. Moreover, we must be convinced of the continuous motion of MS, which brings continuous variations of scatters. According to (1)∼(3), the varying scatters definitely lead to the obvious variations of channel coefficient and therefore the channel statistic.
C. COMPUTATION AND QUANTIZATION OF CHANNEL STATISTICS 1) PROCESSING OF ACF
According to formulae (1) and (2), we can derive the ACF expression at MS analogous to [32] :
where σ 2 h and f (α) denote channel variance and the probability density function (pdf) of the scatter distribution. Similarly, the ACF at BS can be written as:
Looking at (4) and (5), it is explicitly see that the real parts of two ACF expressions are opposite, while their imaginary parts are the same. Hence, as we has pointed out in section III.B, the absolute value of ACF is reciprocal in theory regardless of the PSD shape.
Since the above ACF expressions contain the influence of channel variance, the ACF can be normalized by its value at τ = 0, i.e.,
where we have taken the absolute operation for the sake of ACF reciprocity. The comparisons of R (τ ) at BS and MS can be found in Fig.4 , where the slot length and the normalized Doppler shift are 2048 bits and 0.04. In order to reduce the difference, we average R (τ ) over one hundred slots in each simulation. We can explicitly see in Fig.4 that R (τ ) at BS is in good agreement with that at MS, where the real τ should minus 1. From Fig.4 , τ ∈ [1, 5] in our study is a suitable choice to maintain a reasonable valued range. Though the difference of Fig.4 is small, the quantization operation is necessary to cancel the difference. Thus, a monte carlo simulation are carried out consequently, and the results are provided by Fig.5 .
From Fig.5 , we clearly see that the difference approaches zero with τ ∈ [1, 5] . It reduces the probability of ACF commutating mismatch at BS and MS. Finally, we choose the quantization interval as 0.01 for the ACF. Moreover, there are channel estimation errors in practical application, which may affect the ACF estimates [33] . However, we can exploit the double sampling rate (DSR) method to compute the ACF from noisy channel estimates, which will produce accurate ACF estimate insensitive to the noise [33] . In fact, [33] proved that the DSR-based ACF estimate was nearly the same as its actual noiseless value. Therefore, the proposed algorithm can work with noisy channel estimate.
2) PROCESSING OF LCR
According to [34] , the LCR can be written as:
where ρ is the threshold ratio w.r.t the root mean square (rms) amplitude of channel, while b k (k = 1, 2) represents the k th order centering moment of channel. b k can be calculated as: Then at MS, we have
and at BS, we have
According to (7), (10), (12), (14) and (16), we can conclude that the LCRs at MS and BS are the same regardless of the PSD shape, which is consistent with our conclusion in section III.B. The comparisons of LCR at BS and MS can be found in Fig.6 , where the slot length and the normalized Doppler shift are 2048 bits and 0.04. In order to reduce the difference, we average LCR over one hundred slots in each simulation.
We can explicitly see in Fig.6 that LCR at BS is in good agreement with that at MS, where r th ∈ [0, 7] in our study is a suitable choice to maintain a reasonable valued range. Here r th = ρσ h . Though the difference of Fig.6 is small, the quantization operation is necessary to cancel the difference. Thus, a monte carlo simulation are carried out consequently, and the results are provided by Fig.7 .
From Fig.7 , we clearly see that the difference approaches zero with r th ∈ [0, 7]. It reduces the probability of LCR commutating mismatch at BS and MS. Finally, we choose the quantization interval as 0.01 for the LCR.
Similar as the ACF computation, the noisy channel estimate also affects the LCR estimate. Fortunately, we can also employ the DSR method to estimate LCR. In fact, [35] proved that the DSR-based LCR estimate was insensitive to the noise, and the LCR estimate was approaching to its actual value from the noiseless channel. Hence, the proposed algorithm can work with noisy channel estimates.
D. ANALYSIS OF ALGORITHM SECURITY
Assume that Eve can eavesdrop the signal, and eve is on the line connecting MS with BS, which makes the eavesdropping signal be approximating to the legal signal. Hence, if the information security can be guaranteed at this scenario, the security at other Eve positions can also be guaranteed. Moreover, it is further assumed that the eavesdropper knows the modulation type and the design process of encryption key. Then, the system security is independent of the confidentiality of the encryption algorithm, i.e., all security comes from the variation and sensitivity of time-selective channel.
According to above assumptions, the ACF at Eve can be shown as:
where σ 2 he and f (ϕ) denote the eavesdropping channel variance and the pdf of scatterers. Similar as (6), the normalized 
ACF at Eve is
The b k of eavesdropping channel can be shown as:
Looking back previous discussions, either the angle difference, Doppler frequency difference or both of them will produce distinguishable channel coefficient and statistic. Moreover, the position of eavesdropper is different from that of MS in Fig.1 , thus the corresponding angle of arrival (AOA) of the same scatter is different, viz., α diffs from ϕ. Then, the pdf of AOA is also different, viz., f (α) diffs from f (ϕ). Meanwhile, as we have indicated in section II, if the mobile speed for the MS and sniffer are the same, the AOA difference remains. When MS and Eve do not move synchronously, both the Doppler frequency difference and AOA difference occur. Besides, the MS motion brings time-varying scatters and therefore time-varying AOA distributions, which further enhances channel difference between MS-BS and Eve-BS. Finally, the eavesdropped signal at Eve is different from the legal signal at MS. The detailed simulation will be provided in section IV, where the results demonstrate that the ACF at Eve is quite different from that of legal channel even when f e = f d , while the LCR difference is also enough to drive the Chaotic system to produce different sequences. In fact, according to (7) , (10), (12), (20) and (22), we can conclude that the LCR of legal channel is different from that of eavesdropper, which will be demonstrated by the simulations in section IV.
IV. SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS
The detailed simulation parameter can be found in Tab.I, where the scatter follows the angle cosine distribution plus the modulus uniform distribution [36] . 
A. SIMULATIONS FOR CHANNEL STATISTICS
Here we will demonstrate that the eavesdropper cannot obtain the channel statistics closing to those of legal channel, even the position of eavesdropper is close to MS. Fig.8 and Fig.9 shows the comparisons of ACF for the eavesdropper and MS, where we observe significant deviation between the eavesdropping channel and the legal channel. When f e = f d and f e = 0.8f d , namely the upper and lower f e 's in our study, there are obvious gaps between R e (τ ) and R(τ ). Hence, the ACF in time-selective channel performs well to distinguish the legal and eavesdropping channels. Fig.10 and Fig.11 shows the comparisons of LCR for the eavesdropper and MS, where we observe obvious deviation between the eavesdropping channel and the legal channel. When f e = f d and f e = 0.8f d , namely the upper and lower f e 's in our study, there are observable gaps between the LCR at MS and eavesdropper. Hence, the LCR in timeselective channel can be applied to distinguish the legal and eavesdropping channels. In addition, the next BER simulation will demonstrate that the LCR gap is enough to drive the Chaotic system to produce secret sequence. Based on the above analysis, because the statistics of eavesdropping channel is greatly different from those of legal channel, Eve cannot calculate the correct encryption key, and then the original information is safe.
B. SIMULATIONS FOR BER PERFORMANCE
At first, we must highlight that the previously discussed DSR technique can provide accurate LCR and ACF estimates in general working SNR ranges of communication systems, such as SNR ≥ 5dB. Hence we will provide the BER results for SNR ≥ 5dB. Moreover, we present the Chaotic system of Fig.2: • The upper Chaotic system
• The lower Chaotic system
First, we must prove that the encryption will not degrade the BER performance. In Fig.12 , both the encrypted data and unencrypted data are tested, where the curves of the two kinds of data are superposed. Hence, the proposed encryption algorithm does not affect the BER performance. However, the encrypted data must yield higher security, which can be further confirmed by the next Fig.13 . Fig.13 compares the BERs of legal channel and eavesdropping channel, where the BER of legal channel is the same as that in Fig.12. From Fig.13 , it is clearly that the eavesdropping channel produces very poor and flat BERs regardless of the SNR, since Eve cannot decipher the correct original information due to two reasons. The first is the legal channel and eavesdropping channel produce obvious different channel statistics. The second is that the employed Chaotic systems enlarge the variation and sensitivity of channel statistics. Additionally, we also present the BER comparisons at a higher Doppler shift in Fig.14 , where we observe the performance degradation due to the fast time-varying channel. However, the security of legal user is reserved and Eve fails to demodulate the encrypted data.
Concluding from all simulations, we find that the proposed algorithm is an effective physical layer encryption for the time-selective channel, while the conventional researches cannot be applied in this kind of channel.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a novel encryption algorithm based on channel statistics is proposed for the physical layer security in timeselective channels, in which the channel ACF and LCR are employed to drive two Chaotic sequence generator to produce the encryption key. Moreover, the encryption using channel statistics does not involve the process of key exchange, which further strengthens security. Our studies have shown that though the uplink and downlink channels are nor completely reciprocal in mobile communications, the channel ACF and LCR are theoretically the same at this time, which is confirmed by our simulations. Besides, our derivation and simulation also demonstrate that the eavesdropping channel is independent of the legal channel, leading to significant difference of channel statistics. We test the proposed algorithm by computer simulations, and the BER results prove that the encrypting operation does not affect the performance of legal user, while the eavesdropper cannot recover the original signal. Finally, we can conclude that the proposed algorithm is useful for the physical layer security in mobile communications.
